It is important to note that I will discuss the case for bare particulars only in so far as it sheds light on the notion of a bare particular and on the way in which bare particulars are most naturally deployed within a constituent ontology.
2 It is more apt, of course, to speak of the cases for bare particulars, since philosophers have posited them for various reasons. To provide a preliminary sense for the putative importance of bare particulars in analytic metaphysics, I'll begin by mentioning three standard reasons for postulating them.
First, and traditionally, philosophers have thought that there must be something that bears or has the properties that we ascribe to ordinary objects, a subject of predication, something which underlies properties which is not itself a property. For example, where there is a hard red sphere, there is more than sphericity: there is also something that is spherical in virtue of having sphericity.
Second, and similarly, philosophers have thought that there must be something that unifies the properties that are together associated with and jointly characterize a substance. That is, there must be something for properties to jointly characterize. In the case of the hard red sphere, that which is spherical is also that which is itself hard and red. There is a single subject of all these predications, a subject, which is thickly charactered in virtue of having multiple properties at once. 3 The job of unifying is also assigned to the bare particular. Third, philosophers have thought that there must be something non-qualitative and nonrelational that grounds the numerical difference in the possible case of two qualitatively indiscernible objects. 4 Among other things, the need for such a ground is predicated on an acceptance of realism about properties-the view that properties are universals, shareable properties which are numerically identical in their instances. This kind of argument for bare particulars is the Numerical Difference Argument (NDA) that I detail in Part 2. To be sure, however, not all constituent ontologists accept realism. Trope bundle theorists, for example, subscribe to a constituent ontology on which the properties that constitute objects are not universals, but "particularized properties", or tropes. Some trope theorists go further to posit substrata or bare particulars, but on such a view, bare particulars are not needed to individuate objects, but to play one or both of the first two roles mentioned above. Thus, in what follows I will focus on a realist constituent ontology.
5 I do so because such a framework is the traditional and most natural home for bare particulars and provides a framework in which the concept of a bare particular can be best understood.
Supporting Concepts and Considerations
In order to understand the notion of a bare particular, it is helpful, if not essential, to understand the NDA. This is because bare particulars are defined in terms of the ontological work they are supposed to do-indeed, in terms of the work they alone can do. I will begin by characterizing certain terms and distinctions deployed by the NDA. As we will see, a key move in the NDA is the claim that properties cannot individuate objects. In particular, the claim is that neither Plantinga-style-Essences (hereafter simply "essences") nor coordinate properties can individuate objects.
6 I shall discuss each part of this denial in turn.
The Rejection of Essences as Individuators
First, consider the claim that essences cannot individuate objects. This claim is underwritten by a distinction between pure and impure properties, and this distinction turns on the notion of "ontological constituent-dependence." I will briefly characterize this notion and the distinction it underwrites. However, my aim here is not to defend the rejection of Essences; and this is for two reasons. First, I am somewhat, but not fully convinced the rejection can be sustained. Second, and more importantly, since in this paper I am concerned with clarifying the notion of a bare particular, I will discuss the case for bare particulars only in so far as it sheds light of the notion of one. That being said, the distinction between pure and impure properties is to be understood in the following way. According to Michael Loux (1978, p. 133 ):
[A] property, P, is impure just in case there is some relation, R, and some substance, S, such that necessarily, for any object, x, x exemplifies P if and only if x enters into R with S and that a property, P, is pure just in case P is not impure.
Because Loux means something specific by "substance" and we need not accept his meaning in order to accept the pure/impure distinction, J. P. Moreland (2000, p. 46) has suggested that we replace "some substance, S" with "some particular, S". I will appropriate Moreland's amendment in what follows.
Examples of pure properties include being negatively charged, being square, and being to the left of a person. Examples of impure properties include being identical to Socrates (i.e., "Socrateity") and being to the left of Socrates.
7 The important point is that an impure property is supposed to have a particular as a constituent. Speaking less formally, for example, Loux (1978, p. 132) says that impure properties "'incorporate' at least one determinate substance." Likewise, Moreland (2000, p. 46) says that certain "particulars are constituents of impure properties."
Note that the notion of an impure property assumes that it is possible for an ordinary concrete particular to be an ontological constituent of an abstract object like a property. Call this assumption "CNA" (for concreta in abstracta). This assumption is generally not defended in arguments for bare particulars, and I suspect that the absence of such a defense can be explained in the following way. As far as I can tell, bare particulars are always, in fact, posited within a constituent ontology. Constituent ontologists often assume, as a framework principle, that it is possible for abstract objects like properties to be ontological constituents of ordinary concrete objects. Call the latter assumption "ANC" (for abstracta in concreta). Although it would be interesting to explore the relationship between CNA and ANC, doing so would take us far afield of bare particulars. The relevant point is that assuming CNA seems natural enough for an ontology that already assumes ANC. Nevertheless, this raises an important question: Could bare particulars consistently fit within a relational ontology? More pointedly: Does the rejection of constituent ontology imply the rejection of bare particulars? I will return to this question below.
Let's return to the distinction between pure and impure properties. Given the definition of an impure property, the following is supposed to follow: If F is an impure property that has the particular S as a constituent, then F cannot individuate S. If anything, S is at least part of what individuates F. We can now see how the notion of an impure property is deployed in the argument for bare particulars. Its deployment consists in the following claim: Because essences are impure properties, an essence expressed by "being identical to S" cannot individuate the individual referred to by "S". Let "ECI" stand for the latter thesis. Put less precisely, ECI is the thesis that essences cannot individuate. (I say "less precisely" because the claim at issue is not that an essence cannot individuate any particular whatsoever; the claim is that an essence cannot individuate the particular that comprises it.)
It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the arguments for ECI. Nevertheless, it will serve our purposes to note how disputes concerning essences relate to those concerning the distinction between constituent and relational ontologies.
The typical defense of ECI turns on the claim that essences are impure properties. Thus, it seems open to someone like Plantinga to insist that essences-or at least essences as he understands them-are posited within a relational ontology. As such, essences could be impure only if impure properties are possible within a relational ontology. Since the relational ontologist typically denies that abstracta can be parts of concreta-that is, they reject ANC-it would seem natural for the relationalist to also deny that concreta can be part of abstracta-to deny CNA. Thus, it seems open to the likes of Plantinga to deny that impure properties are even possible within a relational ontology.
Because a relational ontologist seems to be within her rights to reject CNA, let's suppose the rejection of CNA is essential to (or at least a non-peripheral commitment of) relational ontology. It would follow that, on a relational ontology, essences cannot be impure properties. This means that essences like Socrateity are given different ontological assays by the relationalist and constituentist. Thus, when the constituentist argues in the above manner for ECI-that essences cannot individuate-the concept she is attacking is not the relationalist's concept of an essence.
There are two relevant upshots. First, the argument that essences cannot individuate (for ECI) is best seen as an argument from within a constituent ontology. A fully general argument for ECI would have to show that even within a relational ontology, essences cannot individuate. Otherwise, the argument for ECI would seem to involve an infelicitous tacit rejection of relational ontology, or at least a misconstrual of it. Second, one's answer to the question "Do essences or bare particulars individuate objects?" may depend upon one's answer to a more fundamental question, "Is a relational or constituent ontology correct?"
The Rejection of Coordinate Properties as Individuators
Another tactic is to take spatiotemporal properties to individuate objects. However, this approach to individuation is unattractive, if not problematic. It faces the following dilemma, which is developed from a dilemma posed by Moreland (2000, p. 32f) R. K. Garcia
On the one hand, suppose an absolutist view of space and time is correct and that F is a coordinate property (e.g., being at location l) that individuates some particular S. This alternative is unattractive in two ways. First, because F is essential to S, to avoid untoward implications-such as (i) S cannot move and endure or (ii) there is no possible world in which S is at a different location-this alternative will need to take on further assumptions, such as perdurantism, counterpart theory, and/or the addition of modal spatiotemporal properties (e.g., being at location l in world w) to the ontology.
8 Thus, this alternative would seem to require the support of additional substantive and controversial metaphysical theses. Second, it would seem that F itself must be individuated. On pain of regress, this must be done without involving further coordinate properties. Thus, it would seem that taking this route doesn't ultimately solve the problem of individuation.
Suppose, on the other hand, that a relational account of space and time is correct and that a particular S is individuated by R, where R is a spatiotemporal relation (or a conjunction of spatiotemporal relations). If so, then R is an external relation (or R is a relational property had contingently by S). But if R is an external relation, then R presupposes S and so cannot constitute S (Moreland 2000, p. 33) . Hence, if R is a spatiotemporal location, R cannot individuate S. Thus, on a relational view of space and time, there are reasons to think that S is not individuated by a spatiotemporal property. In sum, the general tactic of taking spatiotemporal properties to individuate objects comes with significant costs. It is desirable, if not needful, to look elsewhere for a theory of individuation.
Taking Stock
In this section we've seen that within the framework of a realist constituent ontology, a case can be made that neither essences nor coordinate properties can individuate objects. In the next section we will see how framework principles of a realist constituent ontology rule out other candidate individuators and converge upon the concept of a bare particular.
The Numerical Difference Argument
We will now see how the foregoing concepts and considerations are deployed in the NDA. The argument utilizes the following three principles:
Realism Properties are numerically identical in their instances.
Not-II
The pure version of the Identity of Indiscernibles is false; that is, it is false that necessarily, (x)(y) [(z) (z is a pure property of x ↔ z is a pure property of y) → x=y].
PCI
The Principle of Constituent Identity is true: (x)(y) [(z)(z is a constituent of x ↔ z is a constituent of y) → x=y].
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The NDA goes as follows:
Consider a possible world W with only two (non-overlapping) particulars, S 1 and S 2 , where (i) S 1 and S 2 are numerically distinct, and (ii) it is false that S 1 exists only if S 2 exists, and it is false that S 2 exists only if S 1 exists. Since it is possible (given Not-II), further suppose that S 1 and S 2 share all of their pure properties. Since S 1 and S 2 are distinct, PCI tells us that they must differ with respect to some constituent. That is, either there is some constituent that S 1 has but S 2 lacks, or there is some constituent that S 2 has but S 1 lacks. It is reasonable to infer that both disjuncts are true: that S 1 has a constituent c 1 that S 2 lacks and S 2 has a constituent c 2 that S 1 lacks. Note that c 1 individuates S 1 , and c 2 individuates S 2 . Given PCI and that S 1 and S 2 share all their pure properties, c 1 is either a nonpure property (i.e., an impure property) or not a property at all. If c 1 is an impure property, then it has as a constituent some particular S* which is already individuated. Given that S 1 and S 2 are the only particulars in W, either S* is identical to S 1 or S* is identical to S 2 (exclusive disjunction). But S* cannot be identical to S 1 , since S* is a constituent of S 1 (and not the only constituent of S 1 ). S* cannot be identical to S 2 , for the following reason: Given (ii), above, S 1 doesn't depend for its existence upon S 2 . But if S* is identical to S 2 , then S 1 does depend for its existence on S 2 . Thus, c 1 is not an impure property. So c 1 is not a property at all. But if c 1 is not a property, then c 1 is a particular. If the particular c 1 itself has properties as constituents, then it is possible that there be some particular S** such that c 1 and S** are (non-overlapping and) numerically distinct but share all of their pure properties; but then c 1 and S** must differ with respect to some non-property constituent, and so on… This regress must be finite, so there must be some particular that is a constituent in S 1 and which is simple (i.e., has no constituents). For simplicity of argument, we may suppose that c 1 is this simple particular in S 1 . Thus, c 1 is a simple particular, c 1 is a constituent in S, and c 1 individuates S 1 .
The foregoing argument puts us in a better position to appreciate the notion of a bare particular. Hereafter, "b" stands for any bare particular, where b is a "particular" in that the following statements are true: P1: b is not a property and a fortiori not a nature. P2: Thus, b is not the kind of thing that can possibly be a constituent of more than one ordinary particular.
10
P3: Thus, b individuates the particular of which b is a constituent.
In addition, b is "bare" in that the following statements are true:
B1: b lacks constituents; that is, b is simple. B2: There is no property F such that F is a constituent of b. B3: There is no nature N that is a constituent of b. B4: There is no property F such that b has F essentially. More precisely, it is false that there is some property F such that b is a constituent of a particular S only if F is also a constituent of S.
I will discuss the significance of B4 in more detail below. Notwithstanding all of these descriptions, the notion of a bare particular still bears some bearing out. We will accomplish this by considering objections to bare particulars.
A puckish defender of bare particulars is well advised to follow the lead of Sir Kenneth Clark and distinguish between the naked and the nude. Particulars are nude in that they have no natures, that is, they are not necessarily connected to any specific property or set of properties. A nude particular has no nature, and is to be distinguished from the naked particular which has no properties. Those who claim that there are bare particulars, Russell, Bergmann, Allaire, et al., claim that they are nude of natures, not that they are naked of properties.
This passage typifies how the bare particular advocate will respond to an Absurdity Objection: she will reject (and deny that she ever held) the Naked Premise. Indeed, advocates can (and typically do) accept the plausible principle that a condition for existence is the having of properties. Thus, the bare particular advocate affirms that, necessarily, bare particulars have properties. (As we will see, however, advocates stop short of affirming that bare particulars have necessary properties.)
Not surprisingly, many find this last statement puzzling. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, p. 18) , for example, claim that the bare particular theorist "owes us an explanation" of what she means by saying both that (a) bare particulars have properties, and that (b) bare particulars don't have properties as constituents like ordinary particulars do. Interestingly, Alston's explanation predates their demand for it by over forty years:
…there must be some sense in which a substratum fails to exemplify any universal; why else call it 'bare'? Evidently, what is called for is a distinction of senses of 'exemplify'…. It is not difficult, however, to distinguish two such senses, in terms of which we can give an analysis of the substratum concept which will both reflect the way in which the notion of a substratum has been used and also enable us to [escape Sellars's Absurdity Objection]. (1954, p. 257 ).
Alston goes on to distinguish between an "underlying" sense of exemplification and an "inclusion" sense of exemplification. Moreland calls these the "tied-to" and "rooted-in" modes of exemplification, respectively (2000, pp. 51-2). Coming to terms with this distinction is necessary for understanding the notion of a bare particular. "Underlying" refers to the kind of relation holding between a bare particular b and a property F when they constitute an ordinary particular S; b underlies F. "Inclusion" refers to the kind of relation holding between S and F; S includes F.
In order to flesh out this distinction, consider the (simplified) case of a green and round ball. The bare particular advocate will offer the following assay of the ball: The bare particular in the ball underlies greenness and roundness; the ball includes greenness and roundness. Moreland would say that the bare particular in the ball is tied to greenness and tied to roundness; and, greenness and roundness are rooted in the ball. Importantly, underlying is an external relation. Bergmann (1967, pp. 46-7) is clear on this:
A particular, though bare, is yet a thing. So is the universal it exemplifies, or perhaps better, which it happens to exemplify. The two face each other as equals, as it were. …Also, being bare, a particular provides no cue whatsoever as to which universal or universals it may or may not exemplify. That is why I just said: happens to exemplify. Let me express this state of affairs by saying that a particular and a universal it exemplifies are wholly external to each other. R. K. Garcia Alston (1954, p. 257) goes further, and insists that including is an internal relation:
A substratum might have underlain quite different properties from those which it in fact does and still be the same substratum; since it includes no properties, its identity does not depend on being associated with one set of universals rather than another. But a concrete individual could not possibly fail to include any of its properties and still be exactly the same individual which it is; its self identity depends on its constituents.
However, I think that Alston's additional claim is optional for the bare particular advocate. The reason it is optional is that the advocate should be able to accommodate the possibility that ordinary objects undergo accidental change. Suppose Alston is right, and, suppose that S is an ordinary particular composed of a bare particular, b, and set of properties Σ, such that S underlies the properties in Σ. Then S could undergo accidental change only if there is a kind of possibly contingent exemplification relation R that obtains between S (qua complex of b-underlying-Σ) and some property F, where F is not a member of Σ. It is not clear that R could be the relation of underlying. Regardless, the easiest solution would be to construe inclusion as the kind of relation that can be internal or external. On this solution, the essential properties of an ordinary particular S are those that S includes essentially. Similarly, the contingent properties of an ordinary particular S are those that S includes contingently.
A second objection to bare particulars is raised by D. W. Mertz (2001) . In responding to Absurdity Objections, we saw that the advocate of bare particulars will rightfully insist that, necessarily, bare particulars have properties. As Moreland and Pickavance (2003, pp. 8f ) note, this is not to be confused with the claim that bare particulars have necessary properties. The defender of bare particulars will deny the latter, and her doing so expresses B4 (from above):
B4: There is no property F such that b has F essentially. More precisely, it is false that there is some property F such that b is a constituent of a particular S only if F is also a constituent of S.
Mertz's objection is predicated on B4 and is straightforward: The externality of the underlying relation implies, absurdly, that "properties like Simplicity are both necessary and contingent attributes" of a bare particular (2001, p. 51) . Although this objection can be construed as an Absurdity Objection, I think it is best seen as forcing the bare particular advocate to pay what may seem to be a very high ontological price.
Moreland & Pickavance respond to Mertz as follows:
We believe that the properties said to be necessary for bare particulars are not genuine properties; these include simplicity, particularity, unrepeatability, and those of the three categories of transcendental, disjunctive, and negative properties. (2003, p. 10) .
To be fair to Moreland & Pickavance, they argue at some length that paying the price is neither ad hoc nor idiosyncratic. Given my purposes here, I will forego assessing these arguments. The point at hand is that "paying the price" does not automatically render the concept of a bare particular incoherent. In part, this is because whether this price can be paid is a matter of whether one can assert P1-P3 and B1-B4 without thereby ontologically Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology committing oneself to the existence of some property F such that b has F necessarily. With respect to the question of whether or not this can be done, it is worth keeping in mind that metaphysicians, are, as it were, in the business of finding ways to assert true subject-predicate sentences without thereby postulating a unique property that corresponds to the sentence's predicate. In addition, this means that understanding the concept of a bare particular is achieved by appreciating the force of the NDA, which aims to show that from within a realist constituent ontology there must be something that grounds the numerical difference of ordinary objects which is a particular (not a property) and a simple (lacking constituents).
In conclusion, we can now see why the concept of a bare particular may not make sense within the framework of a relational ontology. As noted above, Moreland & Pickavance deny that particularity is a genuine property. I take it that particularity amounts to being a particular. Clearly then, the bare particular advocate will also deny that bare particulars have individual essences. That is, she will deny that being identical to b 1 (where b 1 names a certain bare particular) is a genuine property, since if this were a property, then b 1 would have it necessarily. But it would seem arbitrary to deny that bare particulars have essences and affirm that ordinary particulars do. Thus, the bare particular advocate should deny that there are individual essences. Note that this considerably increases the ontological price of bare particulars. Even if such essences could not individuate, they could still do things that bare particulars could not, namely, exist in every possible world and thereby ground a host of modal truths. If bare particulars preclude individual essences, then we have an answer to the earlier question of whether bare particulars are consistent with a relational ontology: insofar as a relational ontology deploys individual essences, the answer is No.
